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In this article I examine the history of the Mexican Stock Exchange from
the end of the Revolution until 1975, under the hypothesis that it did not
carry out its pertinent functions in corporate financing but was rather an
economic and political instrument of the government. Due to state inter-
vention and the deficient definition of property rights, its functioning was
completely anomalous except during this period. The article represents a first
step in the study of the role of the stock exchange in Latin American
corporatist economic models.
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RESUMEN
En este artículo examino la historia de la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores desde
el fin de la Revolución a 1975 bajo la hipótesis de que, en lugar de actuar como
un intermediario financiero al uso, ha sido un instrumento político y eco-
nómico del Gobierno. Debido a la intervención estatal y a la deficiente defini-
ción de los derechos de propiedad, su funcionamiento fue completamente
anómalo. En suma, el artículo constituye un primer paso en el estudio del papel
de la Bolsa en los modelos económicos corporativistas latinoamericanos.
Palabras clave: Bolsa, México, mercado de capitales, derechos de
propiedad
1. INTRODUCTION
The onset of the phenomenon known as the second globalisation led
financial specialists and investors to show increased interest in Latin
American countries. However, from an academic point of view such
increased interest has not generated greater retrospective studies of those
countries’ capital markets, especially their stock exchanges. We know little
about the birth and functioning of such exchanges in Latin America, except
for the cases of Havana, Santiago de Chile and Rio de Janeiro, and only for
very specific periods (Levy 1977; Couyoumdian et al. 1992; Moreno Lázaro
2013). Furthermore, the role played by the stock exchange in the recent
development of other emerging economies has been extensively studied,
whereas there have been few studies of this nature in the case of Latin
America and such studies have not been widely read.
This article will centre on one particular stock exchange: that of Mexico
City. The Mexican Stock Exchange is the most recent to be created in Latin
American countries, finally emerging in 1895 (after Sao Paulo in 1850,
Buenos Aires in 1854, La Habana in 1859 and Lima in 1863). As was the case
with the banking system, institutional obstacles, along with the financial
weakness of the federal government and poor development in the country
delayed its creation (Maurer 1932; Coatsworth 1990, pp. 95-106, 1978; Haber
1991, pp. 566-567, 1998, p. 157; Marichal 1993, p. 118; Del Ángel 2002). The
Mexican Stock Exchange has also had a stormy history since then, especially
during the Revolution years.
However, this study deals exclusively with the period when that political
movement had ended. In fact, the period chosen for the study is that which runs
from the aftermath of the 1929 crisis until the 1973 oil crisis. It was a growth
period in an interventionist economy governed by the principles of corporatism,
disdain for the free market and the need to proceed with import substitution to
become an affluent society; hence, our interest from the financial point of view.
JAVIER MORENO-LÁZARO
322 Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History
The article therefore studies the role played by the stock exchange in this
exaggerated intricate economic network designed by the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI from its initials in Spanish) over those years in
which the party enjoyed complete political hegemony and absolute control
over Mexican society at all levels. The analysis from an institutional point of
view can help us better understand the unique evolution of the Mexican
economy over this period. In this sense, our purpose is to clarify the role
that the PRI (a chameleonic and pragmatic party) attributed to it in the
articulation of economic policy.
The working hypothesis used here is that the contribution of the Mexican
Stock Exchange to the economic modernisation of the country during the
period studied was minimal because public authorities imposed functions
upon it that had nothing to do with the normal working of an exchange. It
appears that the exchange fitted well into the prevailing corporatism due to
the absolute control the government had over it through an institution called
NAFINSA, thus adulterating its entire operation and mission. We intend to
show here that the stock market, instead of being an instrument of corporate
financing separate from the state, became a mere mechanism for the finan-
cial control of large companies by the PRI, another piece of the powerful
patronage network woven by this party.
In addition, the hypothesis is based on the fact that the absence of a clear
definition of property rights in financial matters (and even more so where the
stockmarket is concerned) further weakened this institution, which was already
in itself a mere instrument in the hands of the state. This article also deals with
how banks and big businessmen adapted to this radical and exceptional change
in the operating conditions of the capital market and in the financing of
investment. The hypothesis here is that business owners willingly accepted this
adulteration of the stock exchange due to the market entry barriers it created.
To summarise, in this study we examine the attitude of the authorities in
Mexico to the stock market during the years of the so-called golden age of
capitalism. It appears that the state completely eclipsed the exchange to
enable it to control the market in order to meet its own financing needs and
as a mechanism to generate political support among large corporations.
In the following pages, we will try to prove these assertions based on our
own calculations as well as on previously unpublished ones. Indeed, the
study hinges on the evolution of an index that has been especially prepared
for it, having been properly contextualised for the political and economic
changes experienced by the country.
2. THE CREATION OF A STOCK INDEX
The Mexican Stock Exchange has little statistical history. This lack of
data is not an accident: opacity shielded it from greater state control (Haber
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2008, p. 14). It was not even the stock exchange itself that developed its first
index (see Haber 2005, p. 159). Instead, the first index was created by the
League of Nations in 1937, but only for industrial values and only from 1929
up to the year in question (League of Nations 1937, p. 249). A much more
sophisticated index was constructed by the newspaper El Excelsior from 1956
onwards, inspired by the NASDAQ in New York, and which included the
stocks of eleven industrial companies, something which was immediately
taken as a reference by investors. Given the obvious public statistical service
of this index, Nacional Financiera S.A. (NAFINSA), an institution that we
examine below, quickly set up a rigorous retrospective index in 1960
that began in 1950 and included all types of equities (NAFINSA 1977,
pp. 340-348). Meanwhile, the stock exchange did not yet provide its own
calculations, leaving the powerful instrument of information to third parties
(Caso 1971, p. 7). Finally, in 1978, it solved the problem and since then, the
management of the stock exchange has continuously drawn up an Index of
Prices and Values (IPC from its initials in Spanish), including the thirty-five
companies with the highest market liquidity.
The gaps are greater in fixed-income instruments, in securities issued both
by the Treasury and by private companies. For example, there was absolute
silence on bond prices from 1937 to 1978. In this case, the NAFINSA calcu-
lations are not very precise. Another issue was external debt, the market value
of which ceased to be published in 1933, which may have been due either to
the government’s wish to hide information on the country’s limited solvency
from the general public or perhaps because it had been repudiated.
An additional problem limits the possibility of giving information series:
the destruction of the archives and with it the loss of information, which is
extremely difficult to rebuild from stock exchange yearbooks, publications,
which appeared late on and lacked complete and systematic information on
listed companies.
We have thus had to develop our own series based on data of thirty
industrial, banking and mining companies, based on the most elementary
requirements needed in making these calculations (Dimson et al. 2002). All of
them were listed in the period under study and most were also listed at the
beginning of the XXI century. With their value (excluding dividends) a
Laspeyres index was created. Three sectorial series were made using the
average value provided by Lagunilla (1973) and by the press at the time,
weighted by the company’s capital value given the lack of information on
trading volume (Figure 1). The weighting of these sub-indexes in building an
overall index is more rigorous thanks to NAFISA, which published these data
for each sector (Figure 2). The data built go up to 1950, after which
NAFINSA data are used. This year was chosen as a base year to avoid pro-
blems in the splicing of both series, perfectly assembled in our calculations.
The implicit GDP deflator was used to express the series in real terms as
appropriate in these cases (Figure 3).
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Despite the huge financing needs of the state (or perhaps because of
them) information on the price of fixed-income investments is scarce and
fragmentary. Actually, we are only able to provide regular information on
bonds (Figure 4).
As well as the statistical gaps indicated, we must also highlight the lack of
accounting information from listed companies. Only for a few years during
the 1960s did the exchange publish results for listed companies. This makes
it difficult to measure its contribution to the economic modernisation of the
country through increased investment in gross capital in the long run.
3. BACKGROUND: THE EXCHANGE DURING THE PORFIRIATO
PERIOD AND THE REVOLUTION (1885-1932)
Since the mid-19th century in the city of Mexico purchase transactions
between brokers in mining stocks were undertaken although in hiding. They
were first organised in Zócalo and then at the headquarters of the Gas
Company. Only after the 1884 crisis did Porfirio Díaz, president of the
Republic, approve the creation of a stock exchange for the purpose of placing
FIGURE 1
SECTORIAL STOCK PRICE INDEX ON THE MEXICO CITY STOCK EXCHANGE,
1933-1976 (IN CURRENT PESOS, BASE INDEX NUMBERS FOR 1950)
Source: El Economista Mexicano, City of Mexico, various dates, El Excelsior; City
of Mexico, various dates (both available in the Hemeroteca Nacional de México);
NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348); Lagunilla (1973).
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public debt (Lagunilla 1981, pp. 41-42; Costeloe 1993; Marichal 1997,
pp. 129-130; Maurer, 2002, pp. 24-25; Cárdenas and Del Ángel 2011, pp. 31-32).
As in the rest of Latin America, the Mexican Stock Exchange originated not
with the main objective of contributing to the financing of business, but for
the purpose of placing bonds on the secondary market in a fast and easier
way. Thanks to these investors, trade began in the shares of approximately
fifty mining companies held by foreigners (Haber 1989, pp. 79-80). These
operations were carried out in an atmosphere of real euphoria, thanks to
rising silver exports (Solís 1997, p. 97).
The spread of the Argentinean 1890-1891 crisis aborted the first attempt
to create a stock exchange. In 1895, it was reconstituted but without the
cooperation of mining companies that preferred to negotiate their shares on
the stock exchanges in New York and London since they distrusted the
economic and political situation in Mexico (Lagunilla 1981, pp. 41-44;
Ludlow 1990). This was not a surprise since the exchange returned to its
lethargy once again as a result of the 1907 financial crisis, a lethargy that
lasted until the outbreak of the Revolution in 1910 (Cavazos 1976, pp. 59-63;
Cárdenas and Manns 1989; Haber et al. 2003, pp. 93-123; Paz 2006).
FIGURE 2
STOCK PRICE INDEX ON THE MEXICO CITY STOCK EXCHANGE, 1933-1976
(IN CURRENT PESOS, BASE INDEX NUMBERS FOR 1950)
Source: El Economista Mexicano, City of Mexico, various dates, El Excelsior; City
of Mexico, various dates (both available in the Hemeroteca Nacional de México);
NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348); Lagunilla (1973).
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Its leader, Francisco Madero, a moderate of excellent education, was well
received by the capital market. The situation, however, changed radically
after Victoriano Huerta’s coup in 1913. The repudiation of foreign debt and
the abandonment of the gold standard by the new president scared off
investors.
Venustiano Carranza, president from July 1914, sanctioned the mor-
atorium on the payment of external debt. On 6 June 1916, he closed the stock
exchange, blaming it for the «rampant speculation» that threatened the
success of the Revolution. This decision was accompanied by a temporary
closure of banks, which had already essentially been seized (Reina 1946,
p. 26). The institution was reinstated after a month, now under tight state
control and scorned by investors. The importance of this reform was more
than merely circumstantial. Carranza’s concept of the stock exchange as a
dangerous financial intermediary, and only useful if it served the interests of
the state, continued under subsequent Mexican presidents, heirs to the
revolution, for decades.
Pani, the finance secretary appointed by President Plutarco Elias Calles
in 1924, renegotiated foreign debt repayments and handed the issuing
monopoly to the Banco de México, which gave some impetus to transactions
on the exchange (Tedde and Marichal 1994; Oñate 2000). However, the
FIGURE 3
STOCK PRICE INDEX ON THE MEXICO CITY STOCK EXCHANGE AND GDP PER
CAPITA IN REAL TERMS, 1933-1976 (BASE INDEX NUMBERS FOR 1950)
Sources: See Figure 1 and Noriega and Rodríguez (2011); http://dgcnesyp.inegi.
gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/NVO
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outbreak of the Cristera War in 1927 (religious in nature) miscarried his
financial legacy.
Although the country, in economic terms, seemed to have reached the
bottom, it suffered the 1929 crisis with greater intensity than the rest of
Latin America. Securities on the Mexican Stock Exchange during 1930 had
fallen 17.6 per cent, compared with 6.9 per cent in Santiago de Chile
and 15.8 per cent in Bogota (League of Nations 1937, pp. 248-249). In 1931,
a series of bank failures occurred, starting with the bankruptcy of the
Sonora bank.
4. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE NEW PRI ORDER (1932-1958)
Pani’s return to the ministry of finance, under President Adelardo
Rodríguez, brought peace to the Mexican economy after the devaluation of
the peso and the new bank rearrangements that included the creation of
Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) as a bank regulator and a public holding
company that took over failed banks. These measures brought some ease
to a stock exchange that had lived through one shock after another since
its birth.
FIGURE 4
BOND PRICE INDEX ON THE MEXICO CITY STOCK EXCHANGE IN NOMINAL
TERMS, 1933-1976 (IN CURRENT PESOS AND BASE INDEX NUMBERS
FOR 1960)
Sources: El Excelsior, City of Mexico, various dates; NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348).
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The coming to power of President Lázaro Cárdenas in December 1934
dispelled all hopes of maintaining monetary orthodoxy due to his clear desire
to introduce a growth policy using import substitution and the creation of a
public business sector. The stock exchange as an institution was formally
limited since Cárdenas attributed responsibility for the crisis to it. In his eyes, it
was a body owned by spurious foreign interests (Otero De La Torre 1935). In
his distinctly nationalist and statist ideology the stock exchange had no place.
Cárdenas’ prejudice towards the exchange was unfounded given the
limited quantitative importance of the operations performed there in relation
to GDP (Figure 5). In fact, some counsellors advised him to do quite the
opposite; that is, to encourage investment in the stock market, an organi-
sation following the same socialist path that he had initially intended to lead
the Mexican economy along (Otero De La Torre 1935).
However, Cárdenas was much more worried about healing public finance.
To solve this problem he used NAFINSA, conceived now as an agent serving
the Treasury, to buy bonds (Aubey 2005; López 2012, p. 131). Cárdenas made
sure this function was carried out by ordering the Banco de México to buy all
securities issued by the stock exchange and other public banks in 1936 and
1938. Thus, Cárdenas’ coming to power led to a sharp fall in share prices
(Figures 1 and 2) while government bond values rose, endowed now with
greater solvency (Figure 4).
FIGURE 5
VOLUME OF DEALING ON THE MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, 1932-1976 (AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GDP)
Source: NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348).
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During the first years of Cárdenas’ term in office there was considerable
macroeconomic stability, with low inflation and a stable peso (Figure 6).
However, the departure from Pani’s policies and the president’s Keynesian
tendencies caused unease among investors (Torres Gaytán 1980, pp. 228-240;
Cárdenas 1994, pp. 70-89). This sensation was justified; in 1938, Cárdenas
nationalised the petrol companies prompting an immediate fall in the price
of securities, both fixed-income instruments and equities (Figures 2 and 3).
Cárdenas also insisted on extending the moratorium on external debt
repayment, which isolated the country from foreign financing.
The result of such a policy could only cause the weakening of the capital
market, as calculations in Table 1 indicate, drawing on those by Rajan and
Zingales (2003). It is true that this weakening was common in developed
economies studied by these authors. However, in the case of Mexico, the effect
was muchmore intense and, more importantly, the result of action by the state.
The stock exchange, that financial intermediary viewed as hostile
in Cárdenas’ ideology, lost out more than any other. Its contribution to eco-
nomic growth in Mexico, in itself previously at minimum levels (in 1930 this
ratio stood in the U.S. at 1.0) thus sank to irrelevant values. The fall in the
number of listed companies with respect to the population reveals the extent to
which Cárdenas had literally annihilated the exchange, which was wilfully
trying to catch up after the Revolution to match those in Buenos Aires and
Sao Paulo.
FIGURE 6
INFLATION AND THE PESO/U.S.$ EXCHANGE RATE, 1933-1976 (EXPRESSED IN
PERCENTAGES AND PESOS PER U.S. DOLLAR)
Source: INEGI (2009).
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The recognition of the external obligations of the country in 1941 by his
successor Ávila Camacho was a great relief for investors. At the time, the
supply demands of the United States during World War II led to growing
exports, which were reflected in the stock indices (Figure 7). Investors
considered it was beneficial to return to the stock exchange, which was
offering more than generous dividend payouts (Figure 8). They even trusted
equities once again (Figure 3). In such a situation, those particularly favoured
were the mining companies, which had lived through great suffering during
the Great Depression (Figure 9).
However, Ávila Camacho caused an authentic shock in the capital mar-
kets in 1940 by entrusting NAFINSA with industrial financing, completely
eclipsing the stock exchange (Table 2; López 2012, pp. 132-133). The pre-
sident worked under the assumption that Mexican entrepreneurs could not
undertake the country’s industrialisation due to their ongoing preference for
investing in real estate (Hernández 1988, pp. 45-47). Instead the state would
have to invest, channelling private savings into the secondary sector.
NAFINSA was used for this task thus solving the conflict of interest between
the development of the stock exchange and the government in terms of
fundraising (Haber 2008, p. 14).
Ávila Camacho turned the institution into one that caused financial havoc
of enormous proportions, which completely eclipsed the capital market.
From 1944 onwards, NAFINSA raised funds by issuing fixed-income
instruments, which were very attractive to investors. NAFINSA used these
resources to award credit to industrial companies and to buy the equities
they issued. Following this change in its objectives, the loan amounts issued
TABLE 1
MEXICAN CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, 1930-1975
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1930 22.86 0.08 2.37 0.08
1940 15.52 0.06 1.18 0.02
1950 26.55 — 1.52 0.02
1960 11.52 3.19 0.71 0.01
1970 20.10 7.59 1.13 0.01
1975 17.33 10.1 0.19 —
Notes:
(1), Evolution of the ratio of deposits over GDP (%); (2), Evolution of stock market capitalisation over
GDP (%); (3), Evolution of listed market companies per million people; (4), Evolution of fraction of
gross capital to fixed capital raised via equity (%).
Sources: NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348) and INEGI (2009).
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by NAFINSA grew significantly and were issued under very generous terms.
(Figure 10).
Furthermore, NAFINSA took control of the Mexican Stock Exchange. Its
directors decided which companies could or could not be traded. NAFINSA
was not a public holding similar to those created at the time in Europe;
rather, it was a financial instrument organised by the Mexican government to
support its client network in the business sphere. NAFINSA in practice
therefore replaced the Banco de México and the stock exchange since it was
trusted with financing the accelerated industrialisation in place of the other
two intermediaries (Aubey 2005, pp. 36-40).
There is no institution in the economic history of Latin America of a
similar character and size. Nor is it comparable — as previously stated — to
European public holdings such as the Spanish INI or Italian IRI, since these
institutions did not have the mission attributed to NAFINSA on the stock
exchange and they received financing through other means.
In short, Ávila Camacho completed Cárdenas’ work regarding the capital
market. True to Carranza’s revolutionary convictions, he completely nullified the
exchange, which was considered an enemy in his economic project for Mexico.
Under such circumstances, the functioning of the stock exchange was
completely abnormal. The distancing of its values from those in New York
FIGURE 7
DEGREE OF MEXICAN ECONOMIC OPENNESS AND THE STOCK PRICE INDEX
OF THE MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE IN REAL TERMS, 1933-1976 (IN
PERCENTAGES AND BASE INDEX NUMBERS FOR 1950)(*)
(*): Volume of foreign trade with respect to GNP.
Sources: see Figure 2 and Kunzt (2007, pp. 72-73).
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shows this because up to that point they had developed similarly (Figure 12).
The Mexican Stock Market was almost exclusively dedicated to trading fixed-
income securities issued by NAFINSA (Table 2). Development banking also
contributed to this rapid growth; hence, the growth seen in the degree of
development of the financial system in the period while the exchange was
idle (Table 1). Investors limited their contribution to growth so that it was
almost symbolic, mainly through import substitution, by following the dic-
tates of the government and purchasing industrial shares.
Furthermore, the conditions under which shares were traded from then on
had nothing to do with the normal characteristics of such an institution. The
Mexican Stock Exchange had no proper, open and competitive auctions, as
was the case in the rest of the continent, an element not solely due to the
intervention of NAFINSA. Groups of investors trading directly with the com-
pany, with close links to its owners, made up the clientele of the stock exchange
and carried out occasional operations at the behest of its managers (Caso 1971,
pp. 33-34). In 1941, Ávila Camacho himself decreed the legality of the bodies
known as «Financial Groups» (Grupos Financieros) and their operations (De la
Fuente 1993, p. 97). The banks (especially Financiera Banamex, a division of
Banco Nacional de México) also bought large packages of shares that were
then resold to their clients as credit. Thus, a genuinely Mexican form of an
«over-the-counter» (OTC) market was born: «counter sales» («operaciones de
FIGURE 8
DIVIDENDS PAID OUT ON THE MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, 1945-1975
(IN MOVING AVERAGES AND PERCENTAGES OF THE NOMINAL STOCK VALUE)
Sources: see Figure 2.
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mostrador» in Spanish), not subject to any registration or control (Caso 1971;
Hernández 1988, p. 153; Ramírez 2007, p. 43). Thus, NAFINSA and the large
financial groups took over the stock exchange.
FIGURE 9
SECTORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES QUOTED ON THE MEXICAN STOCK
EXCHANGE, 1933-1976 (IN PERCENTAGES)
Sources: NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348).
TABLE 2
INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE
SECONDARY MARKET IN MEXICO, 1945-1970 (IN PERCENTAGES)
Institution 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Stock exchange 4.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 4.8 7.2 3.3
OTC market 96.0 99.8 99.6 99.0 95.2 92.8 96.7
NAFINSA 5.7 39.0 32.9 12.0 1.9
Banco de México 58.9 37.9 39.4 60.42 45.2 51.6
Rest1 31.4 22.9 27.4 189.0 35.5 43.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes:
1Private banks, insurance companies, savings institutions, and financial societies.
2Includes NAFINSA.
Source: Quiroz (1952, pp. 40-50); Comisión Nacional de Valores (1955-1979).
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In order to finance their investments, entrepreneurs preferred to borrow
from NAFINSA rather than reinvest their own profits. Instead of speculating
on the Mexican Stock Exchange, they chose to do so in New York
(Hernández 1988, p. 153; Haber 1997). The government’s financial archi-
tecture satisfied entrepreneurs due to the low costs of borrowing. The high
rate of indebtedness they accumulated guaranteed their loyalty to the PRI,
given the impassivity of employees due to the sedative effects of monetary
illusion and the populist messages of the party in government (Caso 1971,
p. 7). However, the powers NAFINSA had moved Mexico and its companies
away from the global capital market. Additionally, restrictions on capital
movements following the signing of the Bretton Woods agreement were also
partly responsible for this. However, of course the withdrawal of Mexican
securities from the European and New York exchanges, of a voluntary nature
and consistent with Mexican commercial isolation, reduced funding possi-
bilities for large companies (not just mining companies), which had until
then obtained resources for larger investments abroad.
Obviously, the stock index recorded losses year after year, completely
distancing itself from the development of the Mexican economy (Figure 2).
The result was a denaturalised stock exchange, whose priority was securing
FIGURE 10
EQUITY TRADING ON THE MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, 1933-1976
(IN PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF PRIVATE INSTRUMENTS
TRADED)
Source: NAFINSA (1977, pp. 340-348).
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funds for NAFINSA and where only twenty-five equity instruments were
traded. The stronger growth experienced by Argentina, whose Buenos Aires
Stock Exchange was much more powerful and not subject to such severe
state control, reveals, in a very rough approximation to the phenomenon in
the absence of figures to undertake more sophisticated calculations, the
damage in terms of economic development caused by NAFINSA’s power.
Its position was even more marginal after the approval of the Havana
Charter in 1947, a prelude to the first GATT round. Miguel Alemán, the new
president, and his minister for finance and public credit, Ramón Beteta
Quintana, a zealous follower of the autarchic growth path, considered that
the generalisation of the most-favoured nation status included in the agree-
ment harmed the country’s interest (Riguzzi 2003). Therefore, Mexico did
not join the treaty, reinforcing its international isolation.
In this new scenario, the stock exchange was only useful for the state in
financing its discretionary and selective industrial policy. NAFINSA fulfilled
this mission with issues of new equity. To avoid any competition, the
National Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional de Valores) tightened
the access criteria for firms wanting to enter the stock exchange, arguing that
this restriction was necessary to avoid penetration by foreign capital, which
was more demonised than ever before. The number of equities traded, as
well as their trading volume, returned to insignificant levels (Figure 9).
Only large corporations with financial subsidiaries could obtain resources
on the stock exchange by issuing mortgage bonds. This financing strategy
was adopted by the members of the so-called Monterrey Group (Lagunilla
1977, vol. II, p. 77; Cardero 1984, pp. 120-121; Ejea et al. 1991, pp. 30-31;
Cárdenas and Del Ángel 2011, p. 23). The group was created by entrepre-
neurs from that part of northern Mexico and even had its own stock
exchange from 1950 onwards. This policy received the full backing of both
this and other large corporations. NAFINSA’s brokering assured them a very
easy way of funding, avoiding the risk involved in using the exchange. But
above all, in exchange for their loyalty to the PRI, NAFINSA guaranteed the
existence of tough entry barriers to new investors, especially foreigners, who
could alter the status quo.
In sum, this point in the interventionist and autarchic Cárdenas project
carried out by Alemán was reached through the creation of this monopoly,
which integrated financial and industrial activities vertically, not as a result of
strategic decisions, as was the case in the United States, but due to the stimuli
described and with some excess and in a «feudal» sense (Caso 1971, p. 66).
The stock exchange was, paradoxically, the instrument used in achieving this
goal (Castañeda 2010).
The opportunities to export to the United States provided by the
Korean War (1950-1953) and the anti-inflationary policy followed by Adolfo
Ruiz Cortines, elected president in 1951, slightly revived share trading
(Figure 10; Cárdenas 1996, pp 41-46). Share prices and dividends grew
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significantly thanks to this increased openness of the Mexican economy
(Figures 2 and 7).
However, as soon as the conflict ended, apathy returned to the capital
markets. The government, under the strain of runaway inflation and
employer pressure, had to approve a significant devaluation of the peso on
Easter Saturday 1954 (Figure 6). The measure had dramatic effects on the
exchange, from which it was, however, able to recover in the short term.
However, the stop and go abuse of Keynesian policies once again had its
vitriolic effects on the stock market later on. Ruiz Cortines used the policy,
which had been so unpopular in 1958, once again at the end of his term in
office. The stock exchange bid him farewell with the now renowned drop in
dividends (Figures 2 and 8). The PRI government’s economic policy once
more drove private securities out of the exchange, submitting it again to
NAFINSA’s impulses.
5. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC
MIRACLE (1959-1967)
Although his predecessor had done the dirty work, the new president,
Adolfo López Mateos, was faced with a desolate economic outlook when
sworn into office at the end of 1958: inflation was over 40 per cent, the peso
was in free fall and GDP growth had slowed down due to the decline in
exports. In response to this situation, the new minister of finance and public
treasury, Antonio Ortiz Mena, designed a new model of «stabilizing growth»
(crecimiento estabilizador). The new priorities were now creating a stable
currency (forgetting about the idea of competitive devaluations), reducing
inflation, creating a balanced budget, and financing investment through
resources obtained from abroad (Ortiz Mena 1970, pp. 417-441).
With this new growth strategy, which was far from the most entrenched
tenets of the Revolution, and with significant achievements in growth and
prosperity, the government wanted to assign a greater role to the stock
exchange in corporate financing. This philosophy underlay the new law
regulating its activity, which was approved in 1960. Further protection was
awarded by the regulations signed into law in 1963, which declared stock
exchange activity «public», with the aim of removing all obstacles set up by
prior presidents. Additionally, the first investment funds, financial hybrids
that up to that time had been unknown in Mexico, were created and traded
by brokerage firms and mutual funds, whose activities were encouraged. The
government even allowed the opening of a new stock exchange in Guadala-
jara in 1963.
However, index growth (very modest) and dividends distributed are very
misleading in assessing the actual effectiveness of these measures (Figures 2,
8 and 10). In practice, the results of this opening up were very limited,
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despite this much awaited financial modernisation (Caso 1971, p. 20; Solís
1979; Del Ángel 2010). In fact, the contribution of the exchange to economic
growth in the country, according to the estimator used to measure it, may be
divided in two since Ortiz Mena gave priority to banking in this new financial
direction of economic policy (Table 1); hence, the rise of bank values on the
exchange and the sudden interest of investors in securities issued by banks
(Figure 1).
It is true that the number of publicly traded companies grew. Throughout
1963, 356 companies joined the stock exchange, the majority from the
industrial sector (Caso 1971, p. 21). However, only fifty-four were regularly
traded. The owners of the rest entered the stock market to facilitate collateral
loans from banks and the sale of their shares to NAFINSA (Caso 1971, p. 21).
The stock market did not gain popularity among the middle class even
though the Mexican telephone company (Telmex) demanded that its clients
buy its shares to obtain a line (Eiteman 1966, p. 12). In fact, the creation of
the National Association of Stock Exchange Brokers (Asociación Nacional de
Corredores de Bolsa) in 1966 contributed in practice to the creation of new
barriers to market entry by banning individual operators from the stock
market (Cárdenas and Del Ángel 2011, p. 34). The clients of the stock
exchange, in effect, did not change much. The usual buyer was a member of
the «Financial Group» with a minimally diversified portfolio who was only
willing to speculate on the New York Stock Exchange (Caso 1971, p. 19).
However, above all, as denounced by the stock exchange brokers them-
selves in 1963, the negligible scale of equity securities trading held back stock
market development in the country (Figure 10; Lagunilla 1973, vol. II,
p. 156). In 1964, shares represented 5 per cent of the total trading volume on
the Mexican Stock Exchange compared with 92.2 per cent in Rio de Janeiro
and 45.5 per cent in Sao Paulo (61.2 per cent on average for Brazil as a
whole; Eiteman 1966).
It is true that NAFINSA’s control over trading activity diminished (its
instruments went from making up 80 per cent of trading volume in 1960 to a
meagre 19 per cent) in favour of Financiera Banamex and Telmex (Comisión
Nacional de Valores 1969, pp. 35-37; Figure 11). However, the damage done
by NAFINSA went beyond the stock exchange: in 1965, it lent to companies
and underwrote activities to the value of 10.62 billion pesos, of which at least
46.4 per cent went to listed companies. Furthermore, NAFINSA bought
shares on the primary market to the value of 2.24 billion pesos. In all,
transactions driven away from the stock exchange in share trading can be
estimated at 7.71 billion pesos. Altogether, the activity of NAFINSA dimin-
ished the size of the equity market by a factor of five (Nacional Financiera
1965, pp. 248-250).
Furthermore, OTC sales, now known as the «free market» and at that time
already officially recognised, gained extraordinary importance at the expense of
stock market trading, while the government actually claimed it was pursuing
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the opposite goal (Table 2). The insignificant size of stock exchange trading was
also due to investors avoiding it as a result of the lack of incentives and the legal
uncertainty that existed. Not even property rights were properly defined, as
indicated previously (Caso 1971, p. 19). On the Mexican Stock Exchange, as
opposed to the rest of Latin America, not even registered shares were issued
or exchanged; it was the most archaic, cumbersome and slowest stock
market in the Americas (Eiteman 1966, pp. 12-14). «Silent auctions» were not
implemented despite the signing of a computerisation contract with IBM
for this purpose (Lagunilla 1973, vol. II, p. 173). Furthermore, trading was
subject to significant tax pressure, which could be avoided by leaving the
stock exchange.
In such circumstances, the stock index fell over this period due to lower
gold prices and, above all, cheap oil (Figures 2 and 12), along with a fall in
exports caused by foreign trade restrictions established by U.S. President
Johnson’s administration from 1964 onwards.
In fact, from the mid-1960s onwards shares almost completely lost their
attractiveness to investors (Table 3). Inflation, despite being moderate,
decreased the equity return, which now stood at values much higher than those
registered before the 1958 currency devaluation. Return on investment in
Mexico was different from the rest of the world. While equity return multiplied
in the U.S. and Europe, in Mexico its value fell. What is more important,
FIGURE 11
CREDIT AWARDED BY NAFINSA, 1934-1975 (AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP AND
OF TOTAL BANKING CREDIT)
Sources: NAFINSA (1977, pp. 291-292) and INEGI (2009).
THE MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE
Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 339
investment in the country in bonds was extremely attractive when the Western
world was offering near zero returns (Dimson et al. 2002, pp. 275-310). The
increase in equity returns in 1967 is not misleading since the changes in eco-
nomic policy in the United States drove investors away from the stock market,
where only a handful of large companies stayed on. The economic miracle, if it
had ever existed, was over as seen from the perspective of the capital markets.
6. THE STOCK EXCHANGE, RETURN TO AUTARCHY AND SHARED
DEVELOPMENT, 1968-1976
The exchange could not remain indifferent to the 1968 student revolts,
which were bloodily suppressed, and the political uncertainty caused by
them (Figure 2). By keeping inflation below 5 per cent and minimising cor-
porate borrowing, Ortiz Mena managed to tackle the crisis in a year during
which Mexico, with the Olympics, had to show the world it was a developed
country. However, despite the confidence that Ortiz Mena generated among
businessmen, the price index fell, also driven down by the decline in oil prices
FIGURE 12
STOCK PRICE INDEX OF THE MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE AND CRUDE OIL
BARREL PRICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1933-2012 (IN INDEX NUMBERS
BASED ON 1950 DOLLARS)(*)
(*) 1933-1944 U.S. average. 1945-1983 Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura. 1984-2012
Brent dated.
Sources: See Figure 2 and http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2013.html
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(Figure 12). Investors fled from shares even more (Figure 11). This forced
companies to offer generous dividends (Figure 8) at the expense of reinvest-
ment, which had lethal short-term effects on competitiveness.
Things grew worse under Luis Echevarría’s presidency, starting in 1971.
Mena’s replacement could not have come at a more inconvenient moment, in
the middle of the confusion caused by the abandonment of the gold standard
by the United States. With Ortiz Mena’s appointment as president of the
Inter-American Development Bank, the PRI lost its most qualified leader in
economic policy. Echevarría squandered his legacy; inflation increased five-
fold in just 1 year while foreign debt also increased (Figure 6).
The new executive allowed the move into a statist, populist and autarchic
drift starting with the nationalisation of Telmex (Cárdenas 1996, pp. 93-94).
Income from growing oil exports was insufficient and Echevarría’s indus-
trialisation project had to be financed through NAFINSA’s intervention on
the stock exchange, which once again became an instrument that served
government needs (Cypher 1990, pp. 96-107). Moreover, inflation
significantly reduced the real value of NAFINSA’s debt, its shareholders thus
becoming victims in this lenders’ euthanasia, giving further impulse to the
statist project (Figure 4).
Indeed, the new president got rid of the small reforms made on the
exchange during the 1960s to regain Cárdenas’ financial interventionist policy.
Echevarría expressed his intention of doing away with what he called the
«private investment strike» by using a stock exchange reform law in 1975,
now considered an instrument vital to the «shared development» strategy
(crecimiento compartido). Echevarría did not hide his intentions; in the pre-
amble to the Act itself, it clearly expressed the will to achieve «development and
TABLE 3
RETURN ON INVESTMENT INDICATORS FOR MEXICO (1957-1967)
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1957 26.1 19.6 2.3
1963 100.0 12.0 11.8 8.6
1964 87.6 5.1 − 0.3 3.4
1965 100.6 5.2 4.6 8.2
1966 130.3 5.8 3.3 6.3
1967 59.0 12.0 10.6 7.4
Notes:
(1), Profit index (base 1963 = 100); (2), Equity return (nominal terms); (3), Equity return (real terms);
(4), Bond return (real terms).
Source: Comisión Nacional de Valores (1955-1969), Lagunilla (1973) and INEGI (2009).
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full control of the stock market». Furthermore, the law repudiated the market
as a tool for stock market performance, which should be governed by a
superior mechanism: the state. Thus NAFINSA’s control over the institution
was brought back once more, raising its intervention to the highest degree. The
nationalisation of the stock exchange was such that it was considered a pre-
cedent for the nationalisation of banks in 1984 (León 1984).
What is true is that the privileges of financial institutions in stock trading
suffered no alteration whatsoever; despite the announcements of his inten-
tions to do so, Echevarría did not go so far. In the status quo that was
maintained, the «financial groups» recognised by Ávila Camacho continued
their activities without changes except slightly greater control in having to
register their operations, something which was in fact only anecdotal.
The new law, in a misleading gesture towards openness, permitted the
activity of brokerage houses (Casas de Valores). Theoretically, the aim was to
spread the business among the middle classes. According to the official rhetoric,
Echevaria aimed to open the institution to new investors who would share his
goal of «Mexicanizing the industry» (Tello 1979, 2007, p. 581; Ejea et al. 1991,
pp. 33-37; Kessler 1999, p. 42-43). However, this so-called democratisation was
pure rhetoric since the new regulations completely abolished the rights of small
shareholders, namely the benefits of the «tag along» and «drag along» clauses.
Banking houses (including Merrill Lynch) and mutual funds could capture very
few clients due to the lack of legal guarantees (Cárdenas and Del Ángel 2011,
p. 35). In 1968, they handled only 1.4 per cent of the value of stock traded
(Caso 1971, p. 35). Brokers (82 in 1969) confined themselves to reluctantly
executing orders from their clients (never more than fifty on average), never
really developing their bidding skills, due to the limited incentives they had to
do their job compared with other countries (Caso 1971, p. 30). In these
circumstances, the trading volume never exceeded 0.1 per cent of GDP.
Even more fallacious was the alleged Mexicanisation of the Mexican
economy given that external debt grew enormously, being used for the
nationalisation of some 300 companies in 1974. Once more, the autarchic
economic policy led to chaos. Inflation and artificial overvaluation of the
peso led to massive capital flight from the country. The Mexican economic
situation was so tragic that it could not even take advantage of the sudden
rise in oil prices (Figure 12). It was in such circumstances that the stock
market index reached its lowest values since the 1929 crash (Figure 2).
In 1976, inflation grew exponentially, while public deficit exceeded 10 per cent
of GDP (Hernández 1988, p. 41; Cárdenas 1996, pp. 86-106; Kessler 1999,
pp. 42-43). The strong devaluation of the peso that year, with which
Echevarría ended his term in office, led to inevitable drops in stock prices
and dividends (Figures 2 and 8; Tello 1979, pp. 146-182; Torres Gaytán 1980,
pp. 340-358).
Measuring the impact of Echevarría’s policy on the capital markets yields
devastating results (Table 1). The setback suffered by the financial system is
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indisputable. The increased volume of shares traded on the stock exchange
was but the sad result of the growth of public sector debt. In fact, large
companies abandoned the exchange, deterred by state intervention. The
stock market lost any contribution it could make to the modernisation of a
country, which was deeply afflicted.
In short, the attempt to accommodate and extend to the stock exchange
the workings of a fully intervened economy, eliminating its normal opera-
tional mechanisms, had again failed.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The stock exchange has had a residual role in the economic development of
Mexico. This does not imply that the country’s backwardness was due to such
ineffectiveness, but rather that Mexico grew in spite of it. This was due to the
disdain, which politicians felt for the exchange. Porfirio Díaz’s «scientists»
viewed it with suspicion, whereas governments that ruled the country since the
Revolution adulterated its mission entirely. Since Cardenas’ coming to power,
it became an instrument serving the financial needs of the state. Additionally,
the exchange was the means by which the state financially supported its net-
work, offering resources — through NAFINSA — to large corporations that
were inefficient due to the low risk they faced. All PRI governments made use
of the stock market for this non-economic purpose, providing resources or
privatising companies. NAFINSA, a completely abnormal institution in a
modern capital market in a democratic country, both in nature and in its
operations, is the best evidence in the Mexican case that a bad and rigid defi-
nition of property rights in the financial system facilitates state abuse (Kessler
1999, p. 19; Tello 2007, p. 755; Haber et al. 2008, pp. 216-217).
If, in a country like Mexico where there was no effective competition
between political parties until 2000, the modernisation of the financial sys-
tem was inconceivable, much more inconceivable was a change in the
structure of the stock exchange (Haber 2008, p. 12). The democratisation of
investment (seen as increasing the number of those operating in capital
markets), the publicity requirements of listed companies and of the financial
situation of the state itself, speculators’ freedom of action and anonymity in
transactions, are all hard to find in authoritarian regimes. Mexico went
through such a situation during the rule of the PRI, even though such a
statement may seem reductionist and controversial. Violence and a delay in
the country’s democratisation hindered its growth (Haber 2008, p. 48).
It is not surprising that small savers avoided investing on the stock
market. Given the prevailing uncertainty and favouritism they preferred to
keep their wealth as it was rather than try to increase it. Such investment
behaviour is not inherent to Mexican culture; it is the logical consequence of
the inefficiency of political institutions.
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Additionally, the small number of agents dealing, with the support of
the state, facilitated the creation of a few large fortunes and the integration of
business corporations. Apart from the obvious expertise of the managers
involved, such growth could only have taken place on a tightly controlled,
intervened stock exchange, which offered limited access and was governed
by public authorities. Thus, this study of the Mexican case suggests that
state intervention, cooptation and the small size of the exchange facilitated
the creation of very large, vertically integrated companies. Their creators
were the «financial groups», leading players on the market who handled it at
will and with full public support almost from the very outset of the
Revolution.
State submission attenuated cyclical price fluctuations, fluctuations that
had a decreasing tendency (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008, pp. 281-286). How-
ever, at the same time such dependence led the exchange to face critical
situations due to the stubborn policy of Mexican governments in ignoring
public debt and linking the fate of its economy to the price of oil. In the case
of a market like the Mexican one, which was intervened and under state
control, Minsky (1982) and Kindleberger’s (1978) model of financial crises is
not entirely applicable. In Mexico, the crises were the result of political
contingencies and excessive public debt (Newell and Rubio 1984; Cárdenas
1996, pp. 203-208, 2013, p. 212; Tello 2007).
Judged from the perspective of financial orthodoxy, the history of the
Mexican Stock Exchange was a failure due to its almost negligible partici-
pation in corporate financing. However, we must examine it from the cor-
poratist point of view since it was under such principles that it was set up.
Seen from this alternative perspective, its achievements are undeniable given
that it strengthened the PRI network, offered financial support for its poli-
tical dominance through NAFINSA, aided the public treasury and facilitated
the creation of large monopolistic corporations. In fact, what the PRI
achieved through the exchange and NAFINSA, was to institutionalise a
secular practice in the economic history of Mexico, as correctly indicated by
Coatsworth (1978) and Haber (1998): the politicisation of property rights and
contracts and the creation of hegemonic positions on the market.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
STOCK PRICE INDEX IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE IN MEXICO CITY IN REAL
TERMS, 1931-1976 (IN CURRENT AND REAL TERMS, BASE INDEX NUMBERS AND
PESOS FOR 1950)
Year Current terms Real terms Year Current terms Real terms
1931 1.48 171.33 1954 5.66 106.46
1932 1.00 124.20 1955 6.20 103.46
1933 0.84 97.38 1956 7.22 112.43
1934 3.52 407.06 1957 7.77 113.27
1935 0.98 113.40 1958 7.12 98.49
1936 1.80 194.55 1959 6.92 91.87
1937 1.69 144.35 1960 6.97 88.09
1938 0.81 65.86 1961 6.58 80.12
1939 1.59 128.94 1962 6.22 73.50
1940 1.70 130.75 1963 6.44 73.37
1941 2.15 158.03 1964 7.23 77.52
1942 2.72 183.26 1965 8.03 83.80
1943 6.04 349.16 1966 7.59 75.87
1944 6.58 287.80 1967 7.59 73.54
1945 5.03 208.72 1968 7.29 69.80
1946 6.08 196.91 1969 7.41 66.28
1947 4.19 125.53 1970 7.40 63.03
1948 4.11 120.82 1971 7.36 59.00
1949 5.90 164.75 1972 7.78 58.30
1950 3.77 100.00 1973 8.92 58.68
1951 5.29 117.24 1974 8.40 44.74
1952 5.36 109.76 1975 7.53 34.33
1953 5.26 109.15 1976 9.10 34.82
Source: see text.
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TABLE A2
SECTORIAL STOCK PRICE INDEX IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE IN MEXICO CITY,
1931-1976 (IN CURRENT TERM, BASE INDEX NUMBERS FOR 1950)
Year Mining Banking Industry Insurance
1931 16.69 17.90 24.37
1932 13.34 27.16 15.46
1933 31.29 50.62 23.72
1934 167.81 47.53 24.67
1935 34.90 35.80 27.45
1936 66.83 50.00 28.45
1937 34.90 35.80 26.59
1938 30.44 28.40 23.18
1939 31.93 35.19 30.78
1940 46.78 64.81 27.73
1941 53.46 85.19 40.73
1942 82.42 143.21 69.63
1943 102.47 125.93 126.67
1944 104.69 123.46 84.81
1945 115.83 112.35 87.77
1946 106.92 77.78 78.41
1947 69.80 88.27 63.92
1948 78.71 79.01 71.10
1949 87.62 77.16 80.34
1950 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1951 149.57 123.33 150.28 100.42
1952 210.43 126.33 151.03 101.27
1953 258.84 127.33 143.34 104.67
1954 261.45 137.17 154.03 105.52
1955 251.88 149.33 169.61 106.52
1956 245.80 161.00 201.50 111.61
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TABLE A2 (Cont. )
Year Mining Banking Industry Insurance
1957 235.07 165.17 218.76 110.20
1958 235.07 166.50 195.50 126.63
1959 287.54 166.33 187.24 134.99
1960 289.86 166.67 187.62 141.64
1961 289.86 154.33 173.73 138.10
1962 289.86 172.50 162.48 137.39
1963 289.86 179.67 169.61 132.72
1964 306.96 181.83 224.95 131.73
1965 429.57 196.33 247.47 130.17
1966 438.84 237.00 215.20 129.89
1967 400.29 259.17 207.69 133.71
1968 492.75 246.17 201.50 131.87
1969 457.39 232.33 207.69 111.90
1970 446.38 211.33 207.50 106.23
1971 442.03 221.67 206.00 102.83
1972 413.51 235.00 214.82 127.20
1973 579.42 244.83 237.52 132.58
1974 664.64 212.50 232.65 130.03
1975 450.43 216.83 291.56 117.28
1976 454.20 288.67 294.00 118.98
Source: see text.
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